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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-802(1)(b):
[T]he obligation is suspended pro tanto until
the instrument is due or if it is payable on
demand until its presentment.
If the
instrument
is dishonored
action may
be
maintained on either the instrument or the
obligation.

2.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-511 (3) : "[P]ayment by check is
conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of
the check on due presentment."
3.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(2)(c) : "[C]ontract that has
not been previously renewed if the contract has been in effect less
than 60 days. . . .
No cancellation under this subsection is
effective until at least (10) days after the delivery to the
insured of a written notice of cancellation."
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-310(2) and (2)(a):
[I]f a note or an uncertified check is taken
for an obligation, the obligation is suspended
to the same extent the obligation would be
discharged if an amount of money equal to the
amount of the instrument were taken, and the
following rules apply:
(a) In the case
check, suspension
continues until
check or until
certified.

of an uncertified
of the obligation
dishonor of the
it is paid or

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Appellant seeks to clarify the statement of issues on appeal
by stating that the only issue in this case is whether Mr. Bell
had an insurance policy in full force and effect on August 11,
1991, in light of the fact that Phoenix Indemnity did not cancel
the policy for non-payment of premium.

1

Upon further review, it

appears that Appellant's statement of the issues merely refines
Appellee's

statement

of

the

issues,

by

breaking

Appellee's

statement of the issue into workable issues of law, which are:
1.

Whether acceptance of a check as payment is conditional,

which condition is satisfied only when the check is honored at the
bank upon which it is drawn.
2.

Whether

giving

of

a

worthless

check

satisfies

the

condition precedent necessary to form an insurance contract.
3.

Whether

notice

of

cancellation

is

required

when

an

insurance contract does not exist due to the fact that payment of
the premium has not been made.
ARGUMENT
I.
PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S ARGUMENT THAT "ACCEPTANCE OF A CHECK
AS PAYMENT IS CONDITIONAL, [WHICH] CONDITION IS SATISFIED
ONLY IF THE CHECK IS HONORED AT THE BANK UPON WHICH IT
IS DRAWN," WAS RAISED AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND THEREFORE
THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE STRICKEN FROM THE COURT'S
CONSIDERATION.
The Appellee incorrectly states that the matter of conditional
payment was not raised at the trial level and therefore cannot be
considered on appeal. While it is true that two Uniform Commercial
Code provisions, Utah Code Annotated Sections 70A-2-511(3) (cited
by Appellee as 70A-3-511(3)) and 70A-3-802(1)(b), were not cited
at the trial level, Appellee has not cited any case law which sets
forth that statutes or case law not cited at the trial level cannot
be cited on appeal.

(See Appellant's Brief p. 11.)
2

Appellee

rather cites cases standing for the well known principle of law
that issues not addressed at the trial level cannot be addressed
for the first time on appeal.

Phoenix Indemnity has not addressed

an issue for the first time on appeal, but rather has buttressed
its argument that in fact, acceptance of a check as payment is
conditionalf which condition is satisfied only if the check is
honored at the bank upon which it is drawn.
Phoenix

Indemnity

first

addressed

the

issue

that

their

acceptance of Mr. Bell's worthless check was conditional upon its
presentment and subsequent honor by his bank in their Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Phoenix Indemnity stated in their motion for

summary judgment that "the premium payment [Mr. Bell] gave [was]
a condition precedent to receiving insurance."

R. 81. This point

was subsequently argued by Appellee in its Reply Memorandum in
Support

of

Defendant's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

and

in

Appellee

stated in this motion that there are exceptions to the general rule
that "delivery of a check to an insurer and its acceptance thereof
is not payment of the debt until the check itself has been paid."
R. 127.

Phoenix Indemnity addressed the issue again in its Reply

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
and In Opposition to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgmentf

wherein it stated that "acceptance of the premium check by the bank
was a condition precedent to insurance coverage."

3

R. 141.

Based

on the foregoing it is evident that the matter of conditional
payment was in fact raised at the trial level and therefore can be
considered

on

appeal

along

with

the

case

law,

statutes

and

treatises cited in Appellant's brief which supports Appellant's
argument.
II.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 31A-21-303 DOES NOT ADDRESS
THE ISSUE OF CONDITIONAL PAYMENT WHICH UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED SECTIONS 70A-2-511(3) AND 70A-3-802(1)(b)
ADDRESS.
Appellee would like this court to only consider Utah Code
Annotated Section 31A-21-303 when addressing all issues on appeal.
However, that section only deals with cancellation of an insurance
policy.
Utah

It does not address the issue of conditional payment which

Code Annotated

Sections

70A-2-511(3)

and

70A-3-802(1)(b)

address.
Appellee argues that statutes relating to a specific subject
should be given preference over those dealing more generally with
the

subject.

Appellant

agrees.

Utah Code Annotated

Section

31A-21-303 does not address the issue of conditional payment. Utah
Code

Annotated

specifically

Sections

addresses

the

70A-2-511(3)
issue

of

and

70A-3-802(1)(b)

conditional

payment.

Therefore, according to Appellee's argument, Utah Code Annotated
Sections

70A-2-511(3)

and

70A-3-802(1)(b)

should

be

preference when dealing with the issue of conditional

4

given
payment

because they relate specifically to the subject at issue.

Utah

Code Annotated Section 70A-*3-802 (1) (b) states:
[T]he obligation is suspended pro tanto until
the instrument is due or if it is payable on
demand until its presentment.
If the
instrument
is dishonored
action may be
maintained on either the instrument or the
obligation.
In addition, Section 70A-2-511(3) states:

"[P]ayment by check is

conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of
the check on due presentment."
III.
PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S INSURANCE POLICY WAS CONDITIONAL UPON
SUBSEQUENT HONOR OF MR. BELL'S PREMIUM PAYMENT.
The general rule of acceptance of a check as payment is that
a check is conditionally accepted until it is properly presented
and subsequently honored by the bank.
Law and Practice, § 8144, n. 53.

See 14A Appleman, Insurance

See also Utah Code Annotated

Section 70A-2-511(3) ("[P]ayment by check is conditional and is
defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due
presentment.")

Appellee asserts that there are exceptions to the

general rule, namely express or implied intentions.

(Brief of

Appellee, p. 13.)
Although Appellee cites Cullotta v. Kemper Corp.. 87 111.2d
25,

397 N.E.2d

1372

(1979),

in support

of the above

claimed

exception to the general rule, Cullotta is distinguishable from
the case at bar.

In Cullotta neither the binder nor the insurance

5

policy contained any conditional language.

The first conditional

language ever used was in a letter sent to the insured notifying
him that his check had been dishonored due to insufficient funds.
In

that

letter, the

insurer

stated

for

the

first

time

that

"coverage under the policy was "contingent upon payment of the
premium.'"

.Id. at 1374.

In the case at bar, conditional language

was used in both the binder and the insurance policy.

Mr. Bell

signed an application which stated that "if my premium is not
honored

by

the

bank, no coverage will

be

considered

bound."

[Emphasis added.] Further, the insurance policy issued to Mr. Bell
stated on page 1, paragraph 1, that "We agree with you, in return
for your premium payment, to insure you subject to all the terms
of this policy."

[Emphasis added.]

Unlike Cullotta, Phoenix

Indemnity's insurance policy contained conditional payment language
in both the binder and insurance policy evidencing its intent that
insurance coverage was conditional upon payment of his premium.
In addition, Mr. Bell was on notice, long before Phoenix Indemnity
notified him of his dishonored check, that if his premium payment
was not honored by his bank that Phoenix

Indemnity would

not

provide him with insurance coverage.

Phoenix Indemnity's binder

and

intentions

policy

language

express

its

conditional nature of their insurance coverage.

regarding

the

Acceptance of Mr.

Bell's check and obtaining Mr. Bell's signature on the binder
stating that insurance coverage was conditional upon subsequent

6

honor of his check

sufficiently

evidences

Phoenix

Indemnity's

intentions that insurance coverage was conditional.
In addition, Cullotta is again distinguishable from the case
at bar inasmuch as Cullotta involved a renewal policy rather than
issuance of a new policy.
insurance policy

The case at bar deals with an initial

- not one already in force.

Renewal of an

insurance policy is significantly different than issuance of an
initial insurance policy.

Renewal extends the coverage of an

existing insurance policy. Issuance of an initial insurance policy
involves the completion of an application and binder before an
insurance policy is issued.

See Statewide Ins. Corp. v. Dewar, 143

Ariz. 553, 694 P.2d 1167 (1984).

The insurance binder controls

coverage issues before the policy is issued.

The insurance binder

is the insured's receipt and controls coverage issues.

Once a

policy is issued the policy controls the coverage issues.
Appellee also relies on Bartleman v. Humphrey, 441 S.W.2d 335
(Mo. 1969) in support of its position.

Clarification of the facts

in that case is needed inasmuch as Appellee's summary is incomplete
and does not fully explain the facts which ultimately bear on
Appellee's argument.

In Bartleman, Mrs. Humphrey chose not to

renew an existing insurance policy, but rather to arrange for a new
policy with different coverage.
coverage

from

November

29,

The new policy was to provide

1960, through

February

29, 1961.

However, Mrs. Humphrey's bank did not honor her check due to

7

insufficient funds.

Therefore, her check was returned and mailed

to her on December 27, 1960, with a letter stating that "Since the
check was not honored on presentation, the premium is not paid and
your policy has lapsed or will lapse as of 10:00 A.M. on the date
the premium was or is due," namely November 29, 1960.

Thereafter,

on January 6, 1961, Mrs. Humphrey mailed a money order to her
insurance company.

The money order arrived on January 9, 1961.

The company accepted the money order as payment and the policy was
reinstated "effective l-9-61-9:A.M."

Mr. Humphrey was involved in

an automobile accident on January 9, 1961 at 6:10

a.m.

When

advised of the accident the insurer advised the Humphreys that
their

policy

had

lapsed

on

November

29,

1960,

and

was

not

reinstated until January 9, 1961, at 9:00 a.m., after the accident
occurred.

However, insurance records showed that the premium was

paid prior to issuance of the insurance policy.

The money order

was considered as a cash payment. Thereafter, the court found that
the premium payment had been paid at the time of the accident and
that the policy was in effect at the time the accident occurred,
even though the policy had not yet been issued.
Nonetheless, Appellee cites Bartleman for the contention that
Phoenix

Indemnity's

conditional

language

insurance

policy

required

to

did

defeat

not

contain

insurance

the

coverage.

However, the language in the Bartleman policy is different than
that used in the Phoenix Indemnity insurance policy.

8

The Phoenix

Indemnity policy states that:

"We agree with you, in return for

your premium payment, to insure you subject to all the terms of
this

policy."

contract.

[Emphasis

added.]

An

insurance

policy

is

a

Without the condition precedent of consideration, it is

well settle law that the contract is void.

Bartleman at 342.

Because Mr. Bell's insurance premium check was not honored by his
bank, the contract which required payment of the same is void.
It was brought to Appellant's attention and is correct that
Statewide Ins. Corp. v. Dewar, 143 Ariz. 576, 694 P.2d 1190 (1983)
was vacated.

Nonetheless, Statewide Ins. Corp. v. Dewar, 143 Ariz.

553, 694 P.2d 1167 (1984) does not support Appellee's position.
In fact, unlike Appellee represents the facts, an insurance policy
was not issued by the insurer.

(See Brief of Appellee at p. 18.)

The insurer only issued a binder.
conditional

payment

language.

The binder did not contain any
The

Supreme

Court

of

Arizona

therefore only reviewed the "narrow issue of whether a binder for
automobile liability insurance covers the prospective insured for
an accident occurring between the time coverage is bound and the
application for insurance is rejected."

.Id.

The court found

Bartleman, supra, instructive and held that "the insurer has the
right to treat the check as conditional payment" but that "once the
insurer accepts the check without evidencing an intent to do so
conditionally, it can no longer exercise its right to declare the
policy lapsed due to nonpayment."

9

The case at bar is factually

different, inasmuch as it does not deal with a binder
insurance

policy)

discussed

above,

contained

conditional

subsequent

honor

that
both

of

is void

of conditional

Phoenix
language
Mr.

Indemnity's
that

Bell's

Indemnity's intent is evident.

check.

language.

binder

conditioned

(or an

and

policy

coverage

Therefore,

As

upon

Phoenix

Phoenix Indemnity intended to make

insurance coverage conditional upon acceptance and subsequent honor
of Mr. Bell's premium check by his bank.
Appellee seeks to distinguish Tallent v* Tennessee Farmers
Mut. Ins., 785 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1990), by stating that the insured
never had sufficient funds in the bank to cover the check.
Brief of Appellee at p. 19.)

(See

However, the case at bar is not much

different than Tallent because Mr. Bell had sufficient funds on
very few days after giving his worthless check.

There is no cited

case law which requires an insured to determine which day one has
enough funds in his account and then present a check for payment
on that day only.

The fact that the insured in Tallent did not

ever have sufficient funds in her bank only bolstered the court's
determination

that acceptance of a check is conditional

honored by the bank.

until

Obviously, Mrs. Tallent's check would never

have been honored by her bank.

In Mr. Bell's case, there were very

poor odds that presentment at any time would have been met with
subsequent honor of Mr. Bell's check.

Nonetheless, the court in

Tallent found that acceptance of a check is conditional until

10

honored by the bank.
not

liable

for

.Id. at 343.

coverage

Likewise, Phoenix Indemnity is

because

it

is

established

law

that

acceptance of a check is conditional upon its subsequent honor by
the bank.
Phoenix Indemnity demonstrated its intent both in its binder
and insurance policy that coverage was conditioned upon subsequent
honor of the premium payment check.

In addition, legal principles

show that the premium payments are conditional.

Therefore, Mr.

Bell did not have insurance coverage at the time of his accident.
His failure to provide the necessary condition precedent negates
insurance coverage.
IV.
PHOENIX INDEMNITY DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO REFUSE
INSURANCE COVERAGE TO MR. BELL AND IS THEREFORE NOT
ESTOPPED FROM SO DOING.
Appellee contends that Appellant has by its own conduct either
waived or is estopped from relying on the conditional payment rule.
The general rule is that if a worthless check is given for the
first premium, insurance coverage never goes into effect.

See 14A

Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 8144 (1985).
In the case at bar, Mr. Bell signed an insurance application
stating that he understood "that if my premium is not honored by
the

bank,

no

coverage

will

be

considered

bound."

By

this

acknowledged statement alone it is clear that Phoenix Indemnity is
and was not bound to provide insurance coverage to Mr. Bell because

11

acceptance

of the premium

check by the bank was

precedent to any insurance coverage.

a

condition

Zions Bank did not honor Mr.

Bell's premium check and therefore Phoenix Indemnity was not bound
to provide insurance coverage.
Even

if

Justin

Bell

had

not

acknowledged

that

insurance

coverage was conditional upon the bank's acceptance of his premium
check, the general rule is that "in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, the delivery

of a check to an insurer and

its

acceptance thereof is not payment of the debt until the check
itself has been paid."
§ 8144 (1985).

14A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice.

Mr. Bell did not have an agreement with Phoenix

Indemnity that coverage would be provided before his check was
honored.

In fact, the policy that was issued before

Phoenix

Indemnity received notice of Justin Bell's dishonored check, states
again that insurance coverage is conditional upon payment of Justin
Bell's premium.
states:

On page 1, paragraph 1, of the issued policy, it

"We agree with you, in return for your premium payment,

to insure you subject to all the terms of this policy."
added.)

(Emphasis

Appellee itself has admitted that "once Phoenix Indemnity

issued the policy, its terms became controlling."

R. 130.

The

conditional payment of Mr. Bell's premium was never made, and
therefore Phoenix Indemnity did not agree to cover Justin Bell
under the insurance policy.

12

This case at bar is similar to Tallent v. Tennessee Farmers
Mut.

Insurance, 785 S.W.2d 339, 343

(Tenn. 1990) wherein

the

insured issued a worthless check to renew an insurance policy.
The policy that was being renewed included conditional language
precisely the same as Phoenix Indemnity's policy:

"We agree with

you, in return for your premium payment, to provide insurance
subject to all the terms of this policy."

(Emphasis added.)

The

court found this language to constitute conditional language and
the policy was not renewed because issuance of a worthless check
is not considered payment for purposes of coverage by an insurance
company.

The same court also cites Appleman as saying:

"If such

a check is given for the first premium, that coverage never goes
into effect."

Id. at 343.
(1985).

See 14A Appleman, Insurance Law and

Practice,

§ 8144

Like

Tallent,

Justin

Bell

gave

a

worthless

check, not for renewal, but for the first premium.

Because the check was dishonored upon presentment, no coverage was
ever in effect.
The only way Mr. Bell could have obtained coverage was to have
Phoenix Indemnity unconditionally accept his worthless check as a
valid payment.

Phoenix Indemnity did not unconditionally accept

his check. Phoenix Indemnity included conditional language in both
their application as well as their policy.

Phoenix Indemnity did

not waive its right to conditionally accept Justin Bell's check.
Therefore, Phoenix

Indemnity

cannot

13

be

estopped

from

denying

insurance coverage to Justin Bell.
claiming

benefit

of

the

doctrine

"Estoppel occurs when the party
has

relied

upon

actions

or

representations of the other party which are inconsistent with the
position taken by the other party at trial."

Gurley v. State Farm

Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 428 N.E.2d 916 (111. 1981).

Phoenix

Indemnity did not misrepresent its intentions of making acceptance
of Justin Bell's payment as conditional.
policy used conditional

language.

Both the application and

Therefore, the doctrine of

estoppel does not apply to the case at bar.
Appellee asserts the argument that Phoenix Indemnity should
have, but did not resubmit Justin Bell's check for payment.

The

general rule is that an insurer is "not bound to return the check
a

second time for payment."

Practice,, § 8144 (1985).

14A Appleman, Insurance Law and

Justin Bell might have had sufficient

funds on very few days subsequent to the initial dishonor by Zions
Bank.

However, it is not an insurer's responsibility to determine

which day is best to resubmit a check and therefore play a guessing
game.

The check was dishonored and therefore no payment was made,

which leaves Justin Bell without insurance coverage.
Appellee

also argues that Phoenix

Indemnity's

"notice of

cancellation or non-renewal" implies that an insurance policy was
in force and that Phoenix Indemnity was required to and did not
comply with statutory notice requirements to cancel. As discussed
above, not only was the application for coverage conditional, but
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also the insurance policy itself due to the conditional language
on the front page in the first paragraph.

See Tallent at 339.

What Phoenix Indemnity did was make a good faith effort to notify
Mr. Bell that the policy was not in force and never went into force
due to dishonor of his check for insufficient funds.

It was not

Phoenix Indemnity's intent to cancel a policy, rather it intended
to notify Mr. Bell that he did not have any insurance coverage in
force.
It is the intent of the parties that is controlling.

Appellee

cites Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Davis. 151 111. App. 3rd 929,
503 N.E.2d 565 (111. App. 2d D. 1987) cert, den., 571 N.E.2d 427
(1987), in support of its argument that Phoenix Indemnity waived
its right to declare that the insurance policy was not in force.
This case, however, is distinguishable

from the case at bar.

Unlike Farmers, wherein the insurer "waived its right to declare
the policy lapsed for nonpayment of the premium" when the premium
check was dishonored, Phoenix Indemnity's actions never expressly
or impliedly waived its conditional acceptance of Justin Bell's
premium check.
that

its

By all of Phoenix Indemnity's acts, it is obvious

intent

was

to

make

Mr.

Bell's

insurance

coverage

conditional upon acceptance of his check by Zions Bank. When Zions
Bank did not honor Mr. Bell's check, Phoenix Indemnity intended to
notify Mr. Bell of such and also to notify Mr. Bell that he did not
have any insurance coverage. Therefore the "notice of cancellation
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or non-renewal" cannot be construed to imply that coverage was in
force.
Appellee also asserts that Phoenix Indemnity issued Mr. Bell
an insurance policy after it knew his check was dishonored.
is an incorrect assumption of the facts.

This

In fact, one department

at Phoenix Indemnity received notice on July 29, 1991, that Justin
Bell's check had been returned without payment.
another department sent a policy.
different

functions,

there

was

On the same date,

Because departments perform
not

immediate

notice

to

all

departments at Phoenix Indemnity of Mr. Bell's dishonored check.
Therefore, the sending of the policy was not done with notice of
Justin Bell's dishonored check, which also shows that it was not
Phoenix Indemnity's intent to issue a policy unconditionally.
Phoenix Indemnity agreed to provide insurance coverage to Mr.
Bell upon the condition that his check was honored by Zions Bank.
Mr. Bell's check was dishonored, and therefore no coverage was
provided.

Under this

fact

situation, the

law of waiver

and

estoppel do not apply.
V.
CONSIDERATION, WHICH WAS A CONDITION
INSURANCE COVERAGE, WAS NOT RECEIVED.

PRECEDENT

TO

Appellee cites 12 A.L.R.3d 1304, 1318 (1967) claiming that
payment of a premium is not a prerequisite to insurance coverage.
However, Appellee fails to distinguish between insurance binders
and insurance policies.

The law distinguishes between these two
16

types of insurance coverage.
143 Ariz.

553, 694 P.2d

See Statewide Ins. Corp* v. Dewar,

1167

(1984).

Case law dealing with

insurance binders does not always apply to insurance policies.
Id.

Nonetheless, in Dewar at p. 1168, the court stated that

"Neither the binder coverage nor the policy goes into effect until
the payment required has actually been made."
require

payment

of

the

premium

as

a

This court did

condition

precedent

to

insurance coverage.
Appellee seeks to distinguish McCormick v. State Capital Life
Ins. Co., 254 S.C. 544, 172 S.E.2d 308 (1980), from the case at
bar.

However, the cases are identical due to the fact that Phoenix

Indemnity did not know that Mr. Bell's check was dishonored at the
time it issued the insurance policy. Therefore, the court's ruling
that "since the check for the payment of the first monthly premium
was never paid, the insurance policy was never of any force or
effect and afforded the applicant no coverage" still applies to the
case at bar.

Id.

While Appellee correctly states that opinion letters from the
Attorney General are not controlling in the appellate courts of
this

state they do provide insight into the question that is

directly at issue in this case and was provided to the court for
that reason.
Appellee provides no case law that supports its argument that
a

promise

to pay

is

sufficient

17

consideration.

In

addition,

Appellee provides no case law that supports its argument that the
dishonored check given to Phoenix Indemnity is the equivalent to
a promise to pay.
that.

Argument without supporting case law is just

Appellant has cited case law similar to the fact situation

at issue which states that "[t]he mere giving or sending of a
worthless check to the insurer does not affect the payment of a
premium the result being, if such check is given for the first
premium, that coverage never goes into effect . . . "

See 14A

Appleman § 8144, P. 176 (1985).
VI.
PHOENIX INDEMNITY WAS NOT BOUND TO CANCEL A POLICY THAT
DID NOT EXIST IN ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
SECTION 31A-21-303.
Appellee states that the purpose of the notice requirements
are to protect the insured.

While this may be true, in the case

at bar there is not an insured to protect.

One does not become an

insured until all the requirements of a contract have been met.
Mr. Bell did not provide the consideration (payment of the premium)
necessary to form a contract.

Therefore, as more fully discussed

above in Argument V, Mr. Bell did not become an insured because he
did not provide the consideration necessary to form a contract.
While Appellee cites Godov v. Farmers Ins. Group, 759 P.2d
1173 (Utah App. 1988), for the principle of law that notice of
cancellation is required to cancel an insurance policy, this case
can be distinguished

from the case at bar.
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In addition, the

Appellee cites a statute in Godoy that has since been repealed to
support its position.
(1974) (repealed).

(See Utah Code Annotated

Nonetheless, in Godoy, Mr. Godoy was issued a

six month insurance policy.
first six months.

§ 31-41-16(1)

He paid the insurance premium for the

Thereafter he made a payment of twice the usual

monthly amount so that he would have insurance coverage for two
additional months.

Thereafter no premium payments were made.

insurance company sent Mr. Godoy a notice of cancellation.

The

After

the termination date on the notice of cancellation, Mr. Godoy was
involved in an accident.

The court held, under the statute in

effect at the time of the accident, Utah Code Annotated Section
31-41-14 (repealed), that the insurance company was required to
write insurance policies for a term of not less than twelve months
and therefore that Mr. Godoy was considered to have insurance
coverage for a twelve month period.

The insurance company could

not terminate an insurance policy for nonpayment of a premium
payment during the twelve month period when it was required to
provide insurance coverage for not less than twelve months.

While

the new insurance code contains no similar provision, that was the
holding of the court under the old statutory provision.

The case

at bar is not similar in any manner to the issue addressed in
Godoy.

The case at bar does not deal with the issue of the length

of the insurance policy or the cited statutes that have since been
repealed.

Unlike the case at bar, Godoy dealt with an insurance

19

policy that had been issued.
worthless premium check.

Godoy did not deal with an initial

Godoy is therefore inapplicable to the

case at bar.
Appellee next cites Haqerl v. Auto Club Group Ins. Co., 157
Mich. App. 683, 403 N.W.2d 197 (1987), leave to appeal den., 428
Mich.

900

(1987)

distinguishable

to

support

its

position.

from the case at bar.

Haqerl

is

Haqerl deals with

also
the

renewal of an insurance policy rather that formation of an initial
insurance policy.
policy

states:

The renewal language in the Haqerl insurance
"If we

offer

to renew this

policy,

and

the

Principal Named Insured declines, it will automatically terminate
at the end of the policy term.

Failure to pay the required renewal

premium means that our offer to renew has been declined."
at 198.

Haqerl

The court found that this language informed the insured

that he or she is not bound to an unwanted contract when renewal
notices are sent out.

The renewal clause merely notified the

insured that he or she did not have to take any affirmative action
to forego renewal. The fact situation in the case at bar could not
be more dissimilar than it is to Haqerl.

The case at bar does not

deal with a renewal policy or with similar policy language.

The

case at bar deals with an insurance contract that was never formed
due to the

fact that Mr. Bell did not provide

consideration to form a contract.

20

the

necessary

In addition, unlike Appellee contends that Hagerl sets forth
the principle that giving of a premium check evidences payment,
giving of a premium check is not payment of a premium.

The issue

of payment is discussed more fully above and sets forth that
acceptance of a premium check is conditional upon subsequent honor
by the bank.
Neither

(See Argument III.)
of Appellee's cited cases

supports

its position.

Neither case sets forth that an insurance company is bound to give
notice of cancellation in the fact situation at issue in this case,
where an insurance policy does not even exist.

When an insurance

policy does not exist it cannot be cancelled and therefore no
notice of cancellation is required.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Bell signed an insurance application which stated that
"if my premium is not honored by the bank, no coverage will be
considered bound." [Emphasis added.] Further, the insurance policy
issued to Mr. Bell stated on page 1, paragraph 1, that "We agree
with you, in return for your premium payment, to insure you subject
to all the terms of this policy."

[Emphasis added.]

Both the

binder and the insurance policy contain language stating that
insurance coverage in conditioned upon the premium payment being
honored by the bank.
is

the

contract

condition

This subsequent honor of the premium payment

precedent

and therefore

to

the

formation

insurance coverage.
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of

an

insurance

Mr. Bell did

not

provide the condition precedent and therefore no insurance coverage
existed

and

the

insurance

policy

at

issue

is void.

Because

insurance coverage does not exist, cancellation of a policy is
impossible.

One cannot cancel something that does not exist.

For the reasons stated above, Appellant urges this court to
reverse the lower court's ruling and find that Mr. Bell did not
have insurance coverage at the time of his accident due to his
failure to provide the condition precedent to formation of a valid
and binding insurance contract and therefore that Phoenix Indemnity
was not required to provide any notice of cancellation.
DATED this

f ^

day of July, 1994.

WENiJELL E. BENNET^
JEANNINE BENNETT
WENDELL E. BENNETT & ASSOCIATES
/Attorneys for Appellant
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